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COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN THE
CUBAN GOVERNMENT

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COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT

1. Introduction

The objective of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP - Cuban Communist Party) at this time is to increase its control over Fidel Castro and his government without unduly emphasizing the existence of Communist Party members in official positions. Its tactics, therefore, are to conceal the membership, recruitment, or reaffiliation of Party members who now occupy key positions in the government. This is in accord with the training in "legal and illegal activity" which Communist Party leaders from Latin America have been given in China since 1956, epitomized in a secret training manual prepared by the CP China which states, in part, that:

"All of the Party members who work in legal organizations and institutions should patiently retain their legal position for a long time, without revealing their Party affiliation. They should gain power in the organizations and institutions in which they work and they should retain their legal position as long as necessary."

Through these secret Party members, the Party is able to influence governmental policy, and bring about the appointment of additional Communist Party members (secret or known) to governmental positions, and/or the dismissal or neutralization of individuals who cannot be easily influenced or used as fronts. Thus within the Cuban government today there are some known Communists (particularly in the armed forces), some secret Communist Party members who seek to guide and direct governmental policy and administration, and numerous non-Communists, often young and inexperienced, who are used by

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the Communists to execute their plans for national and international subversion. These secret members are also used to defend "unity of action", as advocated by the Communist Party and its known leaders, in order to prepare public and official opinion for the acceptance of recognized Communists in progressively higher levels of government.

These secret Communist Party members are in close contact with known Communist Party leaders, such as Blas Roca, Joaquin Ordoqui, Severo Aguirre, and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who establish public Communist Party policy and are in turn, in contact with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the international Communist apparatus. It is the intention of the Communists to eventually bring such known Communist Party officials into the government, but only after the 26th of July Movement (M-26-7) and other revolutionary political parties have been infiltrated sufficiently to insure protection for the Communists under the guise of a "popular democratic government of national liberation."

Since the victory of the Castro forces, Communist infiltration of the Cuban government and government-supported institutions has been progressing rapidly at all levels. This report cannot cover, in detail, the entire scope of the Communist effort, which is totalitarian in nature. It concentrates, therefore, on evidence of Communist policy and planning prior to the rebel victory and on three areas of major Communist effort. These three areas, on which the Communists have concentrated successively as their strength and influence have increased, are control of the armed forces, control of agrarian reform and the peasantry, and control of foreign policy in support of the USSR. These are treated in the following sections.

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2. The Development of Communist Policy and Activity during the Guerrilla War.

The nature of the Communist policy and tactics can be traced back to the Cuban Communist Party program developed in 1956-57 and officially approved in December 1957, after Cuban Communist leaders had consulted with Soviet leaders at the time of the celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in Moscow. This program, which is the prototype of that which the Castro government is now carrying out, was described by the party to be an interim program -- "no el programa socialista del desarrollo futuro sino el programa democratico, nacional-libertado y agrario del desarrollo actual" ("not the socialist program for future development, but the democratic, agrarian, and national-liberationist program for current development"). It is the program, therefore, that the Communist Party wants to see carried out under Fidel Castro's "bourgeois" government in anticipation of the next stage in which the proletarian dictatorship will be established -- after "democracy and national liberation" have served their purposes and when the Communist Party is officially in control. The Communists have avoided public discussion of their program for this next stage, however.

Following the approval of the Cuban Communist Party program by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the full weight of the international Communist apparatus began to be mobilized in support of the Cuban Communists and their effort to further penetrate and gain control over the 26th of July Movement, led by Fidel Castro. In Moscow, representatives of all the Latin American CP's were instructed in December 1957 to pass resolutions and hold solidarity demonstrations in behalf of the "Cuban People". In January 1958, the Cuban CP addressed a letter to "all socialist and workers' parties of the world" and established an office in Mexico ("care of Sr. Baldomero Albarran, Apartado 7751, Mexico, D.F.") through

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which support was coordinated. The International Students Union and the World Federation of Democratic Youth asked their affiliates to sponsor pro-Cuban demonstrations. Within Cuba the Communists intensified their efforts to gain official recognition from the 26th of July Movement. They would not support the April 1958 strike called by the 26th of July Movement so that they could use the failure of the strike as an argument in favor of collaboration with the Communists. Within the 26th of July Movement itself, pro-Communists such as Ernesto ("Che") Guevara and Raul Castro, increased their efforts to persuade non-Communists, such as Armando Hart and Jorge Almeida (currently the Minister of Education and the Chief of the Air Force respectively), to accept Communist views and support. Guevara, an Argentine who became one of the most important guerrilla commanders, is now Director of the Cuban National Bank and Director of the Industrial Department of the Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA). Raul Castro, Fidel Castro's younger brother, is now Minister of the Armed Forces.

One of the principal coordinators of Communist Party aid to the Castro movement was Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, chief of the Cuban Communist Peace Movement, Secretary of Press and Propaganda of the PSP, and currently Director of Hoy, the PSP newspaper. Rodriguez, a known Communist Party official, holds no government position at the present time, but since 1956 has developed into one of the closest political advisors of Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Ernesto Guevara. He has even been considered, as of December 1959, as a possible replacement for the present Minister of the Treasury within the Cuban Cabinet. Such an appointment has not materialized because Raul Castro and other government leaders feel that the public is not yet prepared to accept "unity" on the governmental level. However, it is apparent that Communist and pro-Communist newsmen are constantly testing public opinion on this subject.

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In early 1958, Rodriguez explained the policy and strategy of the Cuban CP toward the guerrilla movement of Fidel Castro, which the Communists had criticized as being bourgeois and "putschist". Rodriguez now revealed, in meetings with foreign Communist leaders, that the Castro movement had become a "movement of the masses", and that "unity of action" (i. e. inclusion of Communists) had been achieved "at the base" on the basis of opposition to the dictatorship. He stated, however, that because the time was not yet ripe for propounding a truly Communist-inspired "National Liberation Front", the Communists were making but limited suggestions to the Castro movement which did not involve "profound changes".

In accordance with their new strategy the Communists began, about May 1958, to organize small guerrilla units or to join the 26th of July Movement as individuals opposed to Batista who made no attempt to bargain for recognition, asking only that they be allowed to fight with the Castro forces. As fighters, these individuals or small groups were accepted. The Communist Party, however, continued to bargain for public recognition as part of the anti-Batista coalition. Such recognition was rejected by the various non-Communist revolutionary groups which signed the Caracas "unity" agreement with the M-26-7 in July 1958. In August, however, reports from within the Communist Party indicate that a separate agreement was worked out between the PSP Youth Organization (the Juventud Socialista) and certain leaders of the 26th of July Movement, though not at the highest levels. This agreement was with Raul Castro who the Communists have claimed was once a member of the Juventud Socialista. It was worked out, or revealed, after he had broken out of the Sierra Maestra to form the "Second Front Frank Pais", a separate command. From this time on, evidence of Communist influence increased rapidly, particularly in the Second Front, as did provocative actions and allegations against the United States. These provocations and allegations were quickly given world-wide

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publicity through the Communist fronts and press, revealing an organized pattern of cooperation between Raul Castro and the Communists. Under Raul Castro's guerrilla command, the groundwork was laid for the reorganization of the peasants, though the Communists among the organizers concealed their Party affiliation. Significantly, Jose Pepe Ramirez, appointed by Raul Castro as Secretary of Peasant Organization of the Second Front in the early summer of 1958, finally identified himself as a Communist Party member a year later. According to the Communist Party organ Fundamentos for May 1959, a Regional Peasant Congress was held on 21 September 1958 in the Second Front with the aid of Raul Castro. Subsequently, in response to the "demands" of the peasants, Fidel Castro in the Sierra Maestra headquarters promulgated the "Agrarian Law" concerning the right of the peasants to the land. According to Fundamentos, by the time the victory was won there existed "hundreds" of peasant organizations in the various rebel commands, created with the help and protection of the rebel authorities.

Immediately before and after the victory of the Castro movement, the main concern of the party was to develop the guerrilla force into a "people's army" -- that is, a politically-indoctrinated force imbued with a basic Marxist and anti-United States ideology.

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez went to the Sierra in July or August, and remained for seven months. His task was that of preparing and coordinating the work of political indoctrination being carried on by Communists within the guerrilla movement, including the influencing of Fidel Castro himself. The Communists developed, and then exploited, educational programs within the armed forces. From positions within the rebel movement, some close to important commanders, they encouraged political discussion in an attempt to discredit reports and discount opinions which might reflect favorably on

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United States policy, while advancing the theme of "national liberation" as the solution to all Cuban problems, economic as well as political. Among themselves, the Communists studied the works of Mao Tse-tung, Lenin, and other Communist revolutionary leaders.

3. Communist Infiltration of the Armed Forces since the Rebel Victory.

Shortly after the victory of the Castro forces, on 1 January 1959, political indoctrination classes were instituted at La Cabana fortress in Havana. This indoctrination was carried on under the protection of "Che" Guevara, who had been made Commander of La Cabana, and under the direction of Captain Antonio Nunez Jimenez (a crypto-Communist) and Captain Luis Mas Martin (a known Communist) as well as other Communists and M-26-7 leaders who had received some indoctrination in the Sierra and were known to be sympathetic to Communist ideology. These included Captain Pablo Rivalta Perez, a Communist teacher from Santa Clara who fought under the name of Moises Perez, and Luis Alberto Lavandeyra Brama, who had been indoctrinated in Marxism by "Che" Guevara while in the Sierra de Escambray. Some of the students were members of the Communist youth (Juventud Socialista) who had been sent to the Sierra to join the guerrilla movement in the last days of the campaign or who had been enrolled in the army after its victory, such as Orestes Quintana Marquez (Secretary General of the Guanabacoa regional JS committee).

As a result of such controlled assignments, La Cabana became the center for the concentration of Communist and pro-Communist personnel who were to become the agents for spreading Communist propaganda throughout the armed forces. Luis Fajardo Escalona, a Communist Party member, was made Chief of the Military Police of La Cabana. While in this

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strategic position he was secretly responsible to the Party for the administrative control of the Communist youth who joined the army and were assigned to indoctrination courses. These youths when ordered to join the army were sent to a certain recruiting office where their identification as PSP members was noted and confirmed by an officer who was a Communist. These recruits, unlike the non-Communists, were then sent to receive Party instructions from Fajardo. They were told that the Party does not now consider it wise to establish "cells" in the army, but that Party members should operate individually and make themselves "outstanding" through hard work and discipline. They were told that they should contribute five pesos monthly to the Party, read Hoy daily, and instigate political discussions whenever possible, following the line suggested in Hoy but never deviating from the positions taken by Fidel Castro and high M-26-7 leaders. Each was informed that, after his military assignment, he would soon be approached by a Communist Party member who would be his Party contact, bringing him propaganda and training literature and carrying back reports, suggestions, and complaints to the National Committee of the Party.

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez was again directly involved in the organization and teaching of the political indoctrination within the army. Rodriguez and Joaquin Ordoqui Mesa were given special privileges and entree to all military establishments. Other Communists were assigned, through the influence of Raul Castro, to the "cultural department" of the Armed Forces. These included Alfredo Guevara, who had been custodian of the bank account of the M-26-7 in Mexico, and Oscar Ortiz, who became an instructor at Campo Libertad in Havana. Elsewhere in Cuba, particularly in Oriente, Communists were appointed to key positions in the Army. Although not appointed to the highest commands, they could control educational and propaganda activities, or report on officers who were actively or potentially anti-Communist. For example, Anel Escalante Colas, a close

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relative of Anibal Escalante, the editor of Hoy, was made adjutant to the Chief of Information of the rebel army in Oriente Province. Other Communists, who had not participated in the fighting, but who had worked in the Communist fronts, such as the cultural organization Nuestro Tiempo, were called on to aid in the educational work of the army. An example is Amado Palenque y Sainz de la Pena.

Cuban Communist leaders have reported to foreign Communist parties that the political indoctrination given within the army is controlled by Communists. The purpose of this indoctrination has not been to emphasize or identify the role of the Communist Party or to train Communist Party members, but rather to develop a cadre of pro-Communist and crypto-Communist instructors and propagandists who accept the elementary principles of historical materialism and its associated beliefs which make up the so-called "science" of Marxian socialism. These principles include the inevitability of the decline of capitalism, the collapse of "colonialism" and "imperialism", and the development of Socialism and Communism in the image of the Chinese and Russian systems. The emphasis in the political indoctrination course has been on the development of extreme nationalism, hatred for the United States based on "evidence" (dating from the nineteenth century to the present) of outrages and injuries suffered by Cuba as the result of United States political and economic "interference" in Cuban affairs. The courses also deal with the need for agrarian reform and other generally progressive measures, again with the emphasis on the "liberation" of Cuba from foreign controls rather than on the manner in which the agrarian reform and other measures are being executed.

As a result of the Communist-controlled indoctrination courses, the preferential appointment of Communists and pro-Communists to controlling positions in the army, and the elimination of anti-Communists, non-Communists, and

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suspected nonconformists through a variety of devices, the new Cuban army is rapidly coming under the control of the Communist fraction established within it.

Cuban Communist leaders have stated, in secret sessions, that their success is due to the influence over Fidel Castro of his brother Raul -- whom they consider to be the "brains" of the revolution -- and "Che" Guevara. The Soviet political specialist on Latin America, B. Ermolaev, went even further in a speech delivered in Moscow in May 1959. Ermolaev stated that Cuba is the "revolutionary center of Latin America", and that although Fidel Castro's government contained many "unreliable elements" from the petite bourgeoisie, Raul Castro is, "speaking among ourselves", a Communist. Raul Castro currently holds the key position of Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, and has been designated by Fidel, who is the "maximum leader", as the latter's successor in event of his death or incapacity.

Neither Raul nor "Che" have ever admitted being Communist Party members, and even within the Party this is denied. However, Raul's "former" membership in the Communist youth organization has been acknowledged, on occasion, within the Party, and as long ago as 1953 he held a responsible position on the preparatory commission for the Communist-front Congress in Defense of the Rights of Youth held in Vienna. During and since the revolution he continued to work closely with the Communist youth in Cuba. His wife, Vilma Espin, is active in several Communist fronts. It has been Raul Castro who has most actively supported the coordination of international Communist youth activities in the Caribbean area and has called for a "Latin American youth congress" to be held in Cuba in mid-1960, and has supported the convocation of a Latin American "peoples' congress", which has been a Communist objective since 1956. In view of the evidence, it is not unlikely that both Raul and his wife are, in fact, secret members of the Communist Party at the present time.

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It seems less probable that "Che" Guevara is a Communist Party member. However, his close association with Communists goes back many years, and it is known that he was a member of the Mexican-Russian Cultural Institute when in Mexico. After he joined Fidel, his wife, Hilda Gadea (a Peruvian), acted in a liaison capacity between Soviet military advisors in Mexico and various Latin American revolutionaries in exile. She also worked closely with persons identified as Soviet international intelligence agents. (Gadea, now divorced from "Che", is currently employed in the Cuban Agrarian Reform Institute.) "Che" was one of Fidel Castro's small group which invaded Cuba in December 1956. As an advisor to Fidel and later the commander of his own column, he encouraged the study of Marxism among the guerrilla forces and defended the Communists, though with emphasis always on "national liberation". Subsequent to the victory, he was charged by Fidel to organize Cuban aid to the foreign revolutionaries who flocked to Cuba (including those with whom his wife had worked in Mexico), and used his authority in an effort to force these groups to accept Communists as equals in "unified" movements. Guevara's activities as commander of La Cabana fortress, the nature and activities of his appointees, the character of his trip to Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, and his policies as Chief of Industrial Development of the Agrarian Reform Institute all attest to his desire to use the Cuban revolution to support Soviet foreign policy, which seeks to promote the "national liberation struggle" in Latin America and elsewhere as a means of attacking the United States and developing a neutralist bloc which is susceptible to Communist penetration. Although Guevara has relied on known Communists as bodyguards, adjutants, and appointees, and has favored Communists among the foreign revolutionists asking for Cuban aid, his denials that the Cuban revolution is Communist-influenced or supported indicate strongly that he wishes to exploit Cuba as the model of a justifiable, popular, nationalist movement

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which will generate enthusiasm in other Latin American countries and underdeveloped countries where Communism is weak or discredited.

4. Communist Influence within the Agrarian Reform Institute.

Following the initial drive to infiltrate the revolutionary army and control the political indoctrination and loyalty of its members, the Communists shifted their attention to the next important objective -- the infiltration and control of the Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA). The Institute was officially established in June 1959 under the Agrarian Reform Law drafted by Antonio Nunez Jimenez with guidance and advice from Raul Castro and "Che" Guevara. Foreign Communists were also consulted, such as Dionisio Encina of the Mexican Communist Party, possibly because of his experience in the organization of communal farms in Mexico during the Cardenas presidency. Nunez Jimenez, who has worked publicly for the Communists since 1949 and is reliably reported to be a "secret" member of the Party, was appointed the Executive Director of the Institute.

The INRA, both in theory and practice, is a government in itself. It expropriates, manages, and disposes land and other property, it undertakes public works, creates schools, issues publications, carries on "cultural activities", operates stores, and negotiates for economic aid and trade with foreign firms. Nunez Jimenez has told his high INRA chiefs, in private, that they are in fact subservient to no other agency of government. These INRA chiefs are, in practice, considered to be "commisars" in the Soviet sense, and have authority over military and civilian officials within the districts they control. The chiefs include some known and some suspected Communists, and in the lower levels of the bureaucracy are numerous known Party members. Waldo Medina, the INRA's general counsel, is a Communist, as are a number of others on the INRA staff. Thus planning and administration of the INRA is Communist-influenced

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at the very highest levels by Communists and sympathizers, who rely on advice from the Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties in an attempt to bring the functions of INRA into closer agreement with the Communist theory of state control. For example: since its formation, INRA has concentrated, not on the distribution of land to landless peasants, but on the organization of peasants into collectives or cooperatives where they are to receive "profits" rather than "wages". There is no direct tribute paid to Communist Party inspiration, nor does the PSP claim credit for INRA's activities. However, in practice, the Communists have been the only group among Castro's trusted followers in Cuba who have the experience and organization to draw up draft programs, draft regulations, or "studies" which appeal to the government. They have been careful to leave the initiative in Fidel's hands, but to guide Fidel's revolution so that it will, in time, openly rely on Communist advice. Thus, after the formation of cooperatives under INRA had been approved, the Communist theoretical organ Fundamentos, for November 1959, published an article concerning the nature and function of cooperatives, supplemented by a translation of the "Reglamento Modelo para Cooperativas Avanzadas de Productores Agricalas" (Model Regulation for Advanced Agricultural Cooperatives) of the Chinese People's Republic. These comments allegedly were offered in a "disinterested" manner, though some had already been accepted. They present an ideal picture, but the voluntary and democratic aspects which they pretend to favor are invalidated by concessions to the "present stage of the revolution". Fundamentos states that the success of the cooperatives will depend on the quality of administration by INRA, and suggests that "in this first stage, it would be advisable for each of the cooperatives to have an assessor general, appointed directly by the INRA, who, even though he might not possess technical knowledge, would be politically prepared to orient the workers and the cooperative itself along the paths laid out by the Revolutionary Government." This suggestion, which has become a matter of

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practice, is the basis for the appointment of Communists or Communist sympathizers to control the cooperatives, inasmuch as they pose as the most faithful supporters of the revolution and are "politically prepared", despite ignorance of agricultural practices.

The INRA is only one of the government agencies which the Communists seek to control, but it is the most important one for their purpose, as it will allow control of Cuba's economic wealth through a centralized bureaucratic system. Through INRA they will also be able to organize Communist control over the peasantry, thereby preventing the development of a successful rural counterrevolution.

The Castro government has planned other agencies, such as the National Institute of Urban Reform (INRU), to extend control over other sectors of the population. The INRU is to be established in February 1960, and reportedly will have confiscatory powers over all urban land, houses, buildings, and personal property attached to real property. Owners of confiscated property are to be nominally reimbursed, INRU will develop or sell buildings or dwellings on the basis of popular or individual need, and tenants will be allowed to purchase their dwellings through payments equal to their former rent (which the government has already reduced). Through the reallocation of urban property, the INRU will be in a position to control the urban bourgeoisie and to buy the loyalty of the urban proletariat. It is believed that Communist infiltration in the INRU will follow the pattern set in the INRA, though this remains to be seen. It is already apparent, from remarks made by Fidel Castro in private, that the true pattern of "democratic" government which he plans to establish is a bureaucracy controlled by representatives of the Army, the INRA, the INRU, and other autonomous agencies, rather than one controlled by popularly elected officials. It is also apparent that the bureaucracy which is now developing under Castro will be largely controlled by the Communist Party or its

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sympathizers and that elected officials and political parties may, as in the Soviet Union and China, play but inconsequential roles in government.

5. Communist Influence on Cuban Foreign Policy.

After initiating their drive to infiltrate the Army and INRA, which were their first priorities, the Communists and their sympathizers turned to control of Cuban foreign affairs. In this, they have been more concerned with concealing direct Communist participation than in other fields, but their influence has steadily grown. They have obtained the support of high officials of the Cuban government - Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, "Che" Guevara, Armando Hart, and Raul Roa (the Foreign Minister) for various international projects which are known to be Communist inspired, some having been formulated in Moscow.

The purpose for which the Communists are using Cuban foreign policy becomes evident from a review of Soviet Communist Party objectives in Latin America, and specifically, Soviet efforts to promote a Latin American "peoples' congress".

The broad objectives of current Soviet policy toward Latin America were suggested in an article in Kommunist (an important CPSU theoretical organ) in February 1956, signed by M. Danilevich. This article attacked the United States as controlling Latin America in the interest of militarism and profit, and noted the applicability to Latin America of the communique, issued by the Bandung Conference, regarding the "subordination of nations to foreign enslavement, domination, and exploitation". Further on it claimed that "the working class, headed by the Communist parties, was emerging as the most consistent defender of national interests, political and economic independence, peace and democracy." It reported, with approval, the formation of "broad coalitions of patriotic forces" and noted that the development of relations between the

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"Socialist countries" and Latin America will "facilitate the cooperation of these states in matters concerning the supporting and strengthening of peace." The article was, in effect, both a directive to the Communist parties and an offer to nationalist elements of Soviet support.

Coinciding with the publication of the Kommunist article, a special secret conference of Latin American Communist delegates to the XX CPSU Congress was held in Moscow under Soviet auspices. This conference emphasized coordination of Communist activities in Latin America, and proposed the holding of a "peoples' congress" which would be "anti-imperialist" in nature and inspired by the Communists, though attended mainly by democratic personages not linked with international Communism. It is apparent that this "peoples' congress" was designed to circumvent the generally favorable attitude of Latin American governments toward the United States by gaining the support of prominent persons for "anti-imperialist" resolutions or demagogic proposals compromising to United States policies.

The Communists were unable to organize or find sponsors for this "peoples' congress" in 1956 or 1957, and in December 1957 were reprimanded in Moscow by Soviet Communist Party officials charged with Latin American liaison. The Soviets insisted that the "peoples' congress" had become a matter of high priority, and requested further action. Consequently various Latin American Communist party representatives met privately at the Argentine Peace Congress in May 1958 to discuss the organization of the congress, which was mentioned publicly (for the first and only time) in the Bulletin of the World Peace Council later in the year. A tentative date for the Congress (4-7 December 1958) was set, but again the Communists had difficulty in finding non-Communist sponsors and, as the Argentine government became increasingly anti-Communist, the Congress was postponed. Subsequently, it was decided to hold it in some other country, where conditions would be more favorable.

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In February 1959, the CPSU again sponsored a secret conference of Latin American Communist party delegates in Moscow, at the time of the XXI CPSU Congress. The subject of the "peoples' congress" was again discussed, and it was decided that the main theme should be the "defense of national resources." As before, the Soviets indicated that "anti-imperialist" language should be avoided in gaining support for the congress, although the final resolutions should be exploitable for the anti-imperialist campaign. The Communist initiative in calling the congress should be concealed, and leaders such as Lazaro Cardenas of Mexico, Fidel Castro of Cuba, Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela, and Jose Figueres of Costa Rica were suggested as persons who might be "used" to convoke the meeting, thereby assuring it of popular support. Finally, it was decided that "fraternal delegates" from Africa and Asia were to be invited.

As Communist influence in the Cuban government increased, responsibility for the organization of the "peoples' congress" was transferred to the Communist Party of Cuba. The anti-Communist statements and actions on the part of Figueres and Betancourt, otherwise relatively favorably disposed toward the Castro government, probably have eliminated them from consideration as possible sponsors of the Congress. However, a new spokesman has been found in Armando Hart, the youthful Cuban Minister of Education who had already revealed his pro-Communist tendencies by appointing Antonio Nunez Jimenez to a commission charged with rewriting the history of Cuba for use in the public schools. Hart was acting as interim Foreign Minister in July 1959, prior to the appointment of Raul Roa, and used this position to greet foreign delegates to the "Agrarian Reform Forum". He told these delegates that, as Minister of Education:

"I have the intention of convoking in Cuba a congress of political leaders and Latin American personalities,

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among whom will be intellectuals, not specifically government delegates, representatives of institutions, universities, and the workers. In that congress it will be possible to trace the lines of the political future of Latin America. ...It is necessary to establish the fact that it is not only the governments and their armies which determine the policies of countries."

In advancing this project (which foreign Communist parties quickly identified as the "peoples' congress" planned in Moscow) Hart revealed himself as the instrument of the Communists, who through "unity from below" are seeking to circumvent and subvert legitimate governments in the conduct of their national and foreign affairs.

Subsequently, when Foreign Minister Roa went to the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Santiago de Chile in August 1959, Education Minister Hart went also as head of a special mission to meet with leaders of opposition groups from various countries. These included representatives of various Communist and Socialist parties, members of labor organizations, youth movements, and political opposition fronts. Hart was accompanied by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez of the Cuban Communist Party, and was joined later by Raul Castro. These leaders met unofficially, independent of the Foreign Ministers, in order to examine (according to Radio Peiping) the problem of strengthening the "national and democratic movement" in Latin America. Subsequently, the National Action Front (FRAP) of Chile, which played host to the meeting, announced its adherence to Hart's proposal for holding a "congress of democratic personages, representatives of political parties and social and cultural organizations." Raul Castro, who went to Santiago to meet with youth representatives, announced his support of Hart's proposal in September, at which time he also proposed publicly that the Latin American youth congress be held in Havana.

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Paralleling the unofficial meetings attended by Hart and Raul Castro, the representatives of the various Communist parties met secretly at the headquarters of the Communist Party of Chile. Each leader reported on conditions in his own country, the problems which faced the Communists, and the discontent which might be exploited by them. The Cuban representative, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, was appointed to visit various Latin American countries and to prepare a study on the social and economic situation which would be used in preparation for the "peoples' congress". Subsequently, Rodriguez visited Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and other countries where he conferred with various Communist leaders, asking them to prepare material and to visit Cuba to further discuss the matter. In October, therefore, representatives of the Communist Parties of these countries met in Havana, during the plenary session of the Central Committee of CP Cuba. They set a tentative date for the Congress in early 1960 and planned an agenda which would stress the economic development of underdeveloped nations, anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and the struggle against "dictatorships". It was also decided that the congress should be formally convoked through a manifesto signed by well-known non-Communists, probably including Lazaro Cardenas of Mexico, Salvador Allende of Chile, Oswaldo Aranha of Brazil, Wolfgang Larrazabal of Venezuela, and others described by "Che" Guevara as forming the "possible nucleus of a unified position" which might lead Latin American countries to develop the "enviable cohesion maintained by the Afro-Asian countries since the Bandung Conference." Although the sponsors of the conference have not as yet issued their manifesto, and some have not even been approached on the matter, the various Communist parties involved in planning the congress already have special representatives in Havana forming a permanent organizing committee.

The Latin American "peoples congress", as planned by the Soviet and Latin American Communists, is clearly the type of

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non-governmental Communist-controlled "popular" meeting which the International Communist Movement desires prior to (or as a substitute for) action on the official level. It will, if held, be similar in purpose to the "Asian Conference for the Relaxation of International Tensions" which was held in April 1955, just prior to the Bandung Conference, and which gave rise to the Asian Solidarity Committee. It will be similar to the second "Arab Peoples' Conference", which, when united with the Asian campaign, gave rise to the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in Cairo, at which was established the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee.

The campaign in Latin America to unify anti-imperialist and nationalist elements, to the detriment of the United States and the advantage of the Sino-Soviet bloc, thus follows the pattern set in Asia. The organizers have been a small group of professional Communist party members aided by reliable sympathizers already active in front activities. As in Asia, the Communists want to follow up the "popular" congress with action at an official level; thus Danilevich, writing in Kommunist in 1956, set the Bandung Conference as a model for Latin American anti-colonial action. At that time, Danilevich noted that "political development" in Latin America was not as "advanced" as in Asia, obviously referring to the anti-Communist orientation of the governments, and not to their long history of political independence. The Communist infiltration of the Castro government in Cuba has changed this picture, however, and has now given the Communists an opportunity to operate at the official diplomatic level. This has been done, apparently, largely through the influence of Ernesto ("Che") Guevara and the medium of Raul Roa, the Foreign Minister, who recently called for a "congress of underdeveloped nations" to be held in Havana.

The tour of Ernesto ("Che") Guevara to the Afro-Asian countries (June-September 1959) initiated the Cuban policy of

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attempting to draw Latin America closer to these countries in defense of a "neutralist" policy. Official formulation of the policy, however, and the accompanying reorganization of the Cuban Foreign Ministry apparently awaited the return of Guevara from his trip. The nature of the new policy was first outlined, informally, by Guevara on his arrival at the airport on 8 September. It was next described by Raul Castro on 11 September, at which time he approved the Communist-inspired plans for youth and peoples' congresses in Cuba. Guevara further defined the policy on 14 September, and finally, Foreign Minister Raul Roa officially delineated the new policy at the United Nations General Assembly on 24 September.

The new Cuban policy emphasizes sovereignty and independence; neutrality with respect to the capitalist and Communist blocs; and solidarity with the "underdeveloped nations" of Asia and Africa. Cuban officials have particularly emphasized the "third position". Guevara firmly states that he is not a Communist, and that he believes Cuba does not need a Communist system "at this moment". Roa has called capitalism and Communism "twin evils". Yet in practice, Cuban "neutralism" is used as a means of attacking the United States to the benefit of international Communism. Moreover, it is apparent that foreign policy, as carried on by the Foreign Ministry, is supplemented at all levels by government-approved activities designed to circumvent foreign governments by appealing directly to certain groups who are opposed, or potentially opposed, to their governments. Thus the Cuban government, largely through "Che" Guevara, is known to have provided training, supplies, advice, and propaganda support to revolutionary groups seeking to overthrow the governments of the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and certain other Latin American countries. Communist or pro-Communist groups have been particularly favored. Representatives of youth and student organizations, labor organizations, and other groups in foreign countries are given subsidized trips

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to Cuba where they are subjected to propaganda and indoctrination. Cuban diplomatic officials, as well as non-governmental representatives, are used to facilitate organizational activities abroad. For example, Cuban Ambassador Rene Rayneri Parla in El Salvador has been actively involved in Salvadoran labor and student affairs, and reportedly supplied Cuban funds to help the Communist-dominated General Confederation of Salvadoran Labor organize a congress to which other Central American leaders would be invited. In another instance, the Guatemalan government specifically accused the Cuban Ambassador, in conjunction with other high Cuban officials, of complicity in an oppositionist plot against the government. In November 1959, the Venezuelan government rejected Cuban Ambassador Pividals' efforts to have Raul Castro and "Che" Guevara visit Venezuela.

As part of its unofficial foreign policy, and to promote "unity from below" the Cuban government has encouraged and subsidized Cuban participation in Communist-front congresses, such as the World Youth Festival in Vienna (attended by 140 Cubans) and the Communist-organized Latin American Women's Congress in Santiago de Chile. It has encouraged the holding in Cuba of international meetings, often of a Communist-front character, and the participation of foreign "observers" (including Soviet representatives) at Cuban meetings, such as the congress of the Cuban Confederation of Labor. On occasion, Cuban officials use such meetings as platforms for the exposition of Communist-line views on foreign affairs. Thus Antonio Nunez Jimenez, Communist Director of the Agrarian Reform Institute, used the "Inter-American Radio Announcers' Congress" in Havana as a forum for attacking the relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico.

The decision of the Cuban government to organize a "conference of underdeveloped nations" in Havana in late 1960 is one facet of the new foreign policy. It is apparent that the Communist parties in the various Latin American countries, through

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the research undertaken and the non-Communist support acquired in preparation for the "peoples' congress", will be prepared to offer arguments in favor of various "anti-imperialist" or "anti-colonial" views or to levy demands on the "imperialist" or "colonialist" powers. It is probable that the Communist parties in Asia and Africa, through their fronts, will also seek to encourage official participation in the congress and to influence the delegations. Under the conditions existing in Cuba, the congress, if held, will certainly be used as a forum for the presentation of demagogic appeals and denunciations based, in all probability, on the preparatory work done by the Communist parties. It is even more certain that the activities of the congress, regardless of the true outcome, will be propagandized as a victory for the unity of "hungry nations" against imperialist and colonialist oppressors. This will be possible through the controlled Cuban press, now almost completely at the service of the Castro government, and the Communist-dominated Prensa Latina, which now has working agreements with TASS, the New China News Agency, and various Satellite or Communist-infiltrated agencies in other parts of the world.

As with the "peoples' congress", it is probable that the Communists wish to avoid direct participation of known party members in the "underdeveloped nations conference". Raul Roa, the Cuban Foreign Minister, has been closely associated with Communists and Soviet agents, but is not believed to be a Communist Party member or necessarily a sympathizer. Eugenio Soler Alonso, new Cuban Ambassador to India who is visiting the Middle and Far East to seek Asian support for the congress, was well known as a Cuban Communist Party member between 1933 and 1951. He published a column in Hoy, the CP newspaper, until 1945, and has been Cuban correspondent of the Daily Worker, the organ of the CP of the United States. As of 1951, however, he was referred to in Hoy as an "expelled" Communist Party member who had joined the Autentico Party of

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President Prio. As is the case with many "expelled" or "former" Communists, it is not known whether he has, in fact, broken with the Party, or whether he remains a crypto-Communist who has been assigned, in the words of Liu Shao-ch'i, to "gain power in the organizations and institutions in which he works for as long as necessary, without revealing his party affiliation."

6. Conclusion

In review, it is evident that after the increasing military strength and popular support enjoyed by Fidel Castro became apparent in early 1958, the Communists decided to take advantage of the movement's democratic nature and the youth and political inexperience of its leaders. With the aid of Raul Castro and "Che" Guevara, they infiltrated the guerrilla forces and later gained control over the political indoctrination and personnel assignments in the armed forces. They then put their organizational experience to work in the Agrarian Reform Institute, using concepts supplied by the Chinese as a means of diverting Fidel Castro from a policy of aid to individual peasant families to the organization of large-scale "cooperatives" controlled by appointed officials. Next, in the field of foreign relations, Communists sought to inspire or control government policy. Covertly, Cuban Communist Party leaders have conferred with foreign Communist leaders, including those of the USSR and China, and have drawn up plans and undertaken studies for execution by the Castro government. Overtly, Communist sympathizers in the government have encouraged participation in Communist-front congresses and have aided foreign groups in opposition to the established governments in Latin America. Finally, on the official diplomatic level, Communists have apparently provided the inspiration for an attempt to develop unity among the "underdeveloped" nations, using "anti-imperialism" and "anti-colonialism" as a basis for common action, while claiming that such unity will promote neutralism and independence.

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That such neutralism and independence is regarded by Communists only as a step toward international Communist domination is evidenced in the words of the Cuban Communist Party program, which are paralleled in Communist party programs throughout the world. The ultimate goal is that of leading Cuba to "Socialism" under the guidance of the Communist Party, which signifies the incorporation of Cuba into the "Socialist Bloc" headed by the USSR and China and controlled by the international Communist party apparatus.

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